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I. INTRODUCTION
Tensions were high when the Supreme Court announced its decision
1
in the long-awaited Bilski v. Kappos, a case expected to settle a dispute
2
that had spanned more than thirty years over the proper method for
determining the patentability of processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Hanging in the balance were the futures of business methods patents,
risk management patents, software patents, and other processes that
skirted the bounds of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Some speculated an end to
1.
2.

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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3

software patents in the United States entirely. Others predicted
clarification about the physical requirements of the “machine-ortransformation test,” which had been determined by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the sole means for determining
4
patentable subject matter for process patent applications.
Anticipations and expectations were high for some clarity on the
prevailing questions about software patents. Opponents to the existing
system argued that current patentability standards were too broad,
which overburdened the United States Patent and Trademark Office
5
and hindered progress in e-commerce and other areas. Proponents said
that the current system worked just fine, as evidenced by the United
6
States being a global leader in technological innovation. What these
interested parties got instead was little clarification on the machine-ortransformation test, or on software patentability as a whole. Rather, the
Supreme Court confounded the debate by clarifying that the machineor-transformation test was one means for determining whether a
proposed process patent was eligible for patentability, but not the sole
7
8
test . . . oh and abstract ideas still cannot be patented. Obviously, this
ruling fell considerably short of the paradigm-shifting ruling expected,
and commentators on both sides of the software patent issue are in no
better position than they were previously. The resounding question
remained—what is the definition of “abstract?” It had long been
established that algorithms, existing alone as mathematical formulae,
9
were abstract, but where does that leave software, which relies on
algorithms to function and transform data? The Court reaffirmed its
belief that Congress contemplated that patent’s scope would be broad
10
11
and encompassing, while reiterating section 101’s outer bounds. The
3.

David Worthington, In Re Bilski - The End of Software Patents?, SOFTWARE
TIMES
(July
8,
2009,
12:51
PM),
http://www.sdtimes.com/
blog/post/2009/07/08/In-re-Bilski-The-end-of-software-patents.aspx.
4. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“An argument can be made that
the Supreme Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it
either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’”) (emphasis added); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56.
5. Kevin Coughlin, Technology upends the meaning of invention Patent requests shift to
ideas, know-how, THE STAR-LEDGER, March 12, 2000, at A1.
6. Id.
7. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
8. Id. at 3230.
9. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
10. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
11. Id. at 3225 (“[T]hree specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility
DEVELOPMENT
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question further stood that, if software, which is classified as a process
patent, must stand to subject matter muster, would it pass the machineor-transformation test? Seeing as how the Supreme Court failed to rule
definitively on the issue, if a software patent did not pass this test, would
there be any other threshold for determining whether it was patentable,
given the various tests hammered out by the circuit courts over the
years? Hovering on the outskirts of this debate is the fate of DRM, a
heavily algorithm-based technology that currently enjoys patent
12
protection. At the center of the nebulous DRM cloud is its most vital
13
technological component, encryption. It is this patented encryption
technology that remains most vulnerable in Bilski’s wake, and its future
could make or break the industry as a whole.
II. THE SUM OF ITS PARTS: AN OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL RIGHTS
14
MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY AND THE RELEVANT LAW
There really is no generally-accepted definition for “Digital Rights
15
Management.” Put simply, DRM is the layering of both technological
16
and legal means to prevent and discourage third parties from gaining
unauthorized access to digital content. The scope of DRM is very
broad. In their simplest forms, DRM systems act as copy-prevention
systems by preventing, or at the least, impeding, consumers from
copying digital content from various tangible sources, such as DVDs
17
and CDs, cell phones, and eBook readers. In their more complex
forms, DRM systems differ in scope, from facilitating diverse complex
18
business models, such as pay-per-use
systems, to secured
principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”).
12. Greg Vetter, Patenting Cryptographic Technology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 757, 759
(2010).
13. Currently, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) uses the
“380” numerical classification for patents in the general cryptographic class. Id. The
USPTO’s website allows one to explore the various types of patentable subjects under each
class. Class 380 contains several subclasses of encryption claims. See Class 380 Cryptography,
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/
U.S.
web/patents/classification/uspc380/sched380.htm (last modified Aug. 11, 2011).
14. This section in no way attempts to explain, in any major detail, the technologies
associated with DRM. It is merely an attempt to summarize the technologies briefly, leading
then into the more relevant topic of encryption.
15. Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52
AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 324 (2004) (hereafter Bechtold).
16. See infra A(3).
17. See Bechtold, supra note 15.
18. Pay-per-use models involve systems in which consumers pay for their individual
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communication, such as wireless (Wi-Fi) networking and Bluetooth
19
20
technologies, to secure distribution systems, such as music and video
21
downloading/streaming, and secured web browsing, or even online
transactions. While the DRM systems that exist are multifarious, most
share one common trait. The common trait in these systems, and
22
arguably the most important facet of DRM as a whole, is encryption.
Encryption is essentially the process of modifying data systematically, so
as to make that data unreadable, while allowing for the data to be
23
restored to its original state by an (in theory, anyways) authorized user.
The science of using secret codes or methods to prevent unauthorized
24
reading of content is called “cryptography,” and is crucial to
encryption.
Cryptography is by no means a new science. It has existed as a
means for securing information for centuries, dating back to antiquity.
Spartan commanders used a cipher system involving batons and paper,
25
the combination of which was called a “scytale,” to encode messages.
Gaius Julius Caesar communicated with his field generals during
military campaigns with a relatively simple form of cryptography, the
“Caesar Cipher,” in which the letters were shifted three places forward

use of digital content. Id.
19. Joseph Kashi, Hi-Tech in the Law Office: We’re all Confronted by the Mobile
Security Sieve, 28 ALASKA BAR RAG 26, 27 (2004).
20. See Bechtold, supra note 15, at 327. Though, the trend of using DRM encryptions
on music sites is a trend that is falling out of favor. See Christopher Breen, DRM-Free
iTunes: What it Means for You, PCWORLD (created Apr. 7, 2009 12:50 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/162732/drmfree_itunes_what_it_means_for_you.html.
21. See Tim Conneally, Hulu whips up its own DRM to block people from watching
videos outside browsers, BETANEWS, http://www.betanews.com/article/Hulu-whips-up-itsown-DRM-to-block-people-from-watching-videos-outside-browsers/1238697188, April 2,
2009 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (detailing one such DRM system implemented by online
video provider Hulu).
22. Bechtold, supra note 15, at 326 (citing Dean S. Marks and Bruce H. Turnbull,
Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial
Licenses, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198, 204 (2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/wct_wppt_imp/wct_wppt_imp_3.pdf at 11
(“Encryption of content is key for distinguishing clearly between authorized uses and
unauthorized uses, especially in computer environments. No individual or device can decrypt
content ‘by accident’. [sic] Hence, encryption is the keystone of current copy protection
efforts.”) (emphasis added)).
23. See JOAN VAN TASSEL, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 85 (2006).
24. KENNETH R. REDDEN & GERRY W. BEYER, MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 257 (2001).
25. Oliver Pell, A Brief History of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis, CRYPTOLOGY,
http://www.ridex.co.uk/cryptology/#_Toc439908853.
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26

in the alphabet.
The commander in receipt of the encrypted
correspondence would simply shift the letters backwards three spots in
27
the Roman alphabet, and read the newly formed message. During the
middle ages, European governments relied on coded vocabularies,
called nomenclatures, to communicate sensitive diplomatic
28
information. Allied success at capturing and breaking the German
aptly-named “Enigma Machine” and its code, respectively, contributed
29
greatly to the Allied victory in World War II. Historically, with new
advances in technology, came the need for more advanced copyright
laws. This “intertwining” of technology and copyright, wherein the
progress of the former demands expansion of the latter, has spiraled
onward with the march of time, demanding new copyright protections
30
with new advances in technology. But the story of cryptography in
regards to DRM begins in the mid-20th Century. The creation of new,
more accessible content-copying technologies through the 1960s and
1970s, such as copy machines, audio recording devices, and video
recording devices, made it much easier for the average consumer to
copy and distribute media and content, which rendered content31
producing industries all but helpless to enforce copyright protections.
This technologically-induced expansion of inexpensive means for
dissemination of information paved the way for newer technologies to
32
do the same for digital content preceding the turn of the century. As
expected, these technological revolutions necessitated the expansion of
the protections afforded to content producers. What resulted was a
partnership between industry-created technological protections—
DRM—and legislative expansion—the Digital Millennium Copyright
33
Act.
The first thing one must realize when examining DRM encryption
technologies and DRM software is that while they both are considered
synonymous, insofar as patentable subject matter claims (that being a
26. CHRISTOPHER SWENSON, MODERN CRYPTANALYSIS 2 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Bechtold, supra note 15.
29. See Jerry C. Russell, Ultra and the Campaign Against the U-Boats in World War II,
(created Sept. 2, 1996 1:16 PM), http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/navy-1.html.
30. See generally Gary S. Lutzker, Dat’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1991 - Merrie Meldoies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT LJ
145, 149 (1992).
31. See generally Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
1145, 1220 (2000).
32. Id.
33. The DMCA is discussed in more detail infra (B)(3).
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“process” or “method” patent claim), they are intrinsically different.
While not all systems that fall into the DRM classification use
encryption, encryption is the most common means of copy protection
34
and the core technology most associated with DRM. Oftentimes DRM
35
encryption technology is deployed via software. The algorithms that
make up the bulk of encryption schemes are based in advanced
mathematical concepts, and the difficulty of breaking these encryption
schemes depend on the keylength and the system/software
36
implementing the encryption. As time progresses and cryptographic
research advances, new algorithms and new investors arise to put money
37
into patenting new encryptions devices. It is of no surprise then that
the increase in software patenting has directly led to a rise in the need
38
for new cryptographic techniques. A DRM encryption device inventor
will typically apply for a patent on his encryption technology as a
39
“method claim,” which recites the series of steps that comprise the
40
method. Thus, a patent application for a DRM encryption technology
will be considered by the patent examiner as a process patent.
A. Is for Algorithms
1. Encryption: The Common Denominator
41

The technology employed in DRM is vast and complex. A basic
understanding of the encryption and decryption process is necessary
before delving into the issues of patentable subject matter of these
encryption devices. Whether the technology is the type of DRM found
42
43
44
on DVDs, downloadable music, or streaming digital content, most
34. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 89.
35. Vetter, supra note 12, at 758.
36. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91–93.
37. Id. at 95.
38. Brian Spear, Cryptographic Patents: At War and in Peace, 22 WORLD PATENT
INFO 177, 180–81 (2000).
39. For example, the HDCP encryption key patent. U.S. Patent No. 7,034,891 (filed
Jan. 31, 2003).
40. Supra note 14.
41. This article will not attempt to explore the numerous and varied technologies
involved in cryptology and DRM, but will instead focus on the common types of encryption
schemes used in DRM, and more specifically, the encryption and decryption devices
themselves. To go any further into the technological wilderness would fill many books. In
fact, there are already some interesting writings on the more technical and mathematical
aspects of DRM.
See e.g., Sommer, supra note 31; BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C (1994).
42. Such as CSS. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 155. (Author’s note: CSS was not
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DRM technologies employ patented encryption devices, or technologies
that encrypt or scramble, using an algorithm, the digital content so that
45
it is unreadable without the decryption key. Encryption is the most
common means of copy protection, and is the core technology
46
associated with DRM.
The content-provider will then license, to
device manufacturers, the encryption scheme, with the encryption and
decryption keys necessary to first encrypt their content, rendering it
47
unreadable, and then decrypt and thus access and display/play it.
48
Two common types of encryption schemes are “symmetric”
49
encryption and “asymmetric” encryption.
Symmetric encryption
schemes, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption,
involve the encryption of data by one party, who then shares the key
that decrypts it with the second party, who decrypts the data with that
50
key. A second type of encryption scheme is an asymmetric or “public51
52
key” scheme. This type of scheme, such as RSA, is more complex. In
a public-key encryption scheme, each party has two keys—a public key
and a private key. One party sends his public key to the other party.
The other party uses his private key in conjunction with the first party’s
public key to encrypt the data. The first party can then use his private
53
key to decrypt the data.
patented. Robert Warren, et al., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) List § 2.11.2, OPENLAW
DVD/DECSS
FORUM,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/dvd-discussfaq.html#ss2.11.2.
USER
IDENTITY
VERIFICATION,
http://www.pat43. See
INTERNET
rights.com/InternetUserIdentityVerification.html.
44. HDCP encryption key patent. U.S. Patent No. 7,034,891 (filed Jan. 31, 2003).
45.
HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/encryption.htm (last
visited March 22, 2012) (“But the most popular forms of security all rely on encryption, the
process of encoding information in such a way that only the person (or computer) with
the key can decode it.”); Thomas Claburn, Apple, Dell, Intel Sued Over Encryption Patents,
INFORMATION WEEK (Mar. 31, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
news/global-cio/legal/216402041 (listing examples of encryption patents and the lawsuits that
result).
46. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 94.
47. See infra Section A(3).
48.
“Schemes” should, for our purposes, be considered synonymous with
“algorithms.” Compare Schneier, supra note 41, at 11 with VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 94.
49. Schneier, supra note 41.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. The RSA encryption was named after its creators, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman.
See RSA Algorithm, SEARCHSECURITY, (Aug. 1, 2000),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA. For an excellent and easy-to-digest
explanation of the algorithm, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b57zGAkNKIc.
53. Id.
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DRM technology vendors have begun to realize the importance of
selecting the right encryption algorithms and implementations.
54
Symmetric-key algorithms are now popular for encrypting content.
Examples include RC5 and RC6 from RSA Security, Blowfish and
Twofish from Counterpane Labs, and AES, the government successor
55
to DES, which is based on a Belgian algorithm called Rijndael. Publickey algorithms are still used for generating digital signatures and can be
used to add further protection to symmetric-key algorithms, by
56
encrypting them again.
These examples show the important role that algorithms play within
57
the encryption/decryption process. Having established the importance
of encryption to the DRM landscape, we must now briefly look at why
these various encryption schemes come about. This begs the question:
If encrypting content is the industry standard for protecting that content
from unauthorized users, and an encryption scheme’s effectiveness is
gauged by the “strength” of its algorithm, how do cryptographers make
these encryption algorithms “stronger”?
2. Strength in Numbers
As stated previously, the strength of DRM encryption schemes
58
depend on the “strength” of their respective encryption algorithms.
An algorithm’s strength is derived from different factors including the
length of time it would take a cracker to break the algorithm using a
59
60
brute-force-attack or the algorithm’s susceptibility to cryptanalysis.
The most basic and obvious measure of an algorithm’s strength is the

54. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 95.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. These are very basic, simple examples of the encryption/decryption process;
however, the role of algorithms within the encryption process cannot be downplayed.
Algorithms are crucial to the encryption process, and thus DRM as a whole.
58. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 90.
59. A “cracker” is a general term used to describe someone who attempts to decrypt
or otherwise circumvent the encryption protections on encrypted content. A brute-forceattempt is one example of measures used by crackers. In this method, the cracker uses a
program that runs through a massive list of letter and number combinations until the key is
found.
See Brute-force Attack, COMPUTER HOPE (last viewed Jan. 29, 2012),
http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/b/brutforc.htm. This tactic is still very much in use
today, as users of Sony’s Playstation Network discovered when 60,000 accounts were hacked
using this very same method. John Leyden, Sony network ransacked in huge brute-force
attack, THE REGISTER (posted Oct. 12, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2011/10/12/playstation_network_brute_force_attack/.
60. VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91–93.
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algorithm’s key length. The key is the secret number necessary to
decrypt the encrypted content; the longer the key, the more difficult it is
62
to discover. If a key can be up to N digits, the total number of possible
63
keys that it could be is 2 to the Nth power. Thus, a key length of 18
returns 262,144 possible keys, only one of which works. While key
length is a general provision for determining the strength of an
encryption algorithm, it should not be assumed that a longer key is
automatically more impervious to cracking than a shorter key. Keys can
be broken merely by educated guess, finding patterns within the
64
generated numbers, or even ignoring the encryption entirely and
65
Thus, more complex
finding holes in other parts of the system.
algorithms, in effect, make it more difficult for a cracker to find patterns
or guess the key to decrypt content. Thus, not only is encryption
dependent upon algorithms, but encryption’s livelihood hinges on its
effectiveness, and its effectiveness depends, at least in part, on the
strength of its encryption algorithm.
B. The Industry Standard
1. The Chain Rule
Behind DRM’s forward line of troops—encryption algorithms,
stands a second and equally complicated array of defenders—licensing
66
agreements. Encryption and decryption of content requires a license
67
of the relevant encryption technology. In order to completely protect
digital content, every “link” of the “chain,” from content producer to
consumer, must remain secure. This is done through a complex set of
licenses between encryption technology producers and digital content
68
transmitting technology producers. The device connections between
these links must be licensed with the proper encryption and decryption
69
keys from the encryption producer. These links are more intricate
than one may initially realize. In theory, every link must maintain the
61. Id.
62. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91.
63. Id.
64. Many cryptosystems involve random number generators, which can sometimes
exhibit patterns. Id. at 92.
65. Id. at 92–93.
66. As before with encryption, this is not meant to be all-inclusive, but rather a brief
overview of licensing agreements.
67. Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22.
68. Id. at 13–24.
69. Id.
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digital content’s encryption as the content is passed to the next link.
With this in mind, take the example of a consumer watching a
legitimately purchased DVD. The DVD itself must be encrypted, then
the digital content contained therein decrypted by the DVD player,
then re-encrypted by the DVD player as it travels through the DVD
71
player’s memory to the output jacks, then finally decrypted within the
72
ports connecting the output cables to the television.
Unlicensed
devices may transmit encrypted content, so long as they do not decrypt
73
the content in doing so. The theory behind all of this encryption and
decryption is that every link along the chain must be protected, lest a
tech-savvy third party tap into the chain and copy un-encrypted digital
content, thus circumventing the whole DRM system entirely.
Standardizing DRM systems is a complex task, involving the
intertwining interests of not just the content producers and end
consumers,
but
also
the
computer,
broadcasting,
and
74
telecommunications industries.
This complex licensing-technology
hybrid guarantees that, at least in theory, digital content moving from
point A to point B, through any medium, will have some sort of
protection from being copied, whether that content is on DVDs, digital
75
downloaded music, or other types of digital content. “In order to be
successful on the mass-market, DRM technologies have to be integrated
into consumer devices in a standardized way . . . from the creation of
content to its consumption by individual users, it must be assured that
no single device or component can transmit the content in an
unencrypted form, as this would compromise the security of the DRM

70. Id. at 11. Marks and Turnbull describe the devices and services that “are capable
of playing back, recording and/or transmitting” secure digital content as “way stations” that
must maintain content as securely as it was received . . . [that further] may not pass content
which has been legitimately decrypted through either analog or digital connections to other
devices and systems without the appropriate protections.” Id.
71. For examples of the types of technology used to transmit and/or store encrypted
digital data, see Bechtold, supra note 15, at 326 n. 11 (“digital container”) and 327 (“Rights
locker architectures”) n. 12 (describing a rights locker architectures with sources for further
information). As this paper deals primarily with encryption, expounding upon these in any
further detail would prove irrelevant to its focus.
72. For a lengthy, fun example of a DVD’s encryption licensing agreement for DVD
players, see “Advanced Access Content System (AACS) Adaptor agreement,” available at
http://www.aacsla.com/license/AACS_Adopter_Agrmt_090605.pdf, or the plethora of other
licensing agreements utilized by AACS, available at http://www.aacsla.com/license/.
73. Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22, at 11–13. To do so would violate the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. See infra section C.
74. Bechtold, supra note 15, at 330.
75. See generally Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22, at 12–25.
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2. Sine on the Dotted Line
In addition to these technological licensing agreements are usage
contract licensing agreements. Usage contracts tend to follow a similar
77
pattern. This pattern is that, prior to accessing the content, a consumer
must agree to certain rules limiting the extent of that consumer’s use of
that content. Usage contracts take various forms, from a standard
78
“Terms of Service” agreement to “End User License Agreement[s]”.
Usage contracts provide another layer of protection for content
producers and their licensees, as these contracts add one or more claims
for breach of contract to circumventing or decrypting DRM protections.
This adds the additional complication of breach of contract versus
copyright infringement claims, actual damages versus disgorgement
damages, and other issues that arise when a licensing agreement is
79
breached.
3. The Prime Variable
The slew of protections available to content producers does not end
with contracts and the legal ramifications of breach of contract or
breach of the licensing agreement. The big guns in DRM’s arsenal, at
least in regards to digital content that is copyrightable, is the Digital
80
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA makes it not just a
felony, but a very costly felony, to circumvent DRM protections on
81
copyrighted material.
The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of “a technological
82
83
measure that effectively prevents access to a [copyrighted work ].”
Furthermore, the DMCA also prohibits the importation, manufacture,

76. Bechtold, supra note 15, at 330.
77. See id. at 339.
78. Id. at 339–40.
79. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use 3–9 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished
working paper, on file with the University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics and
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/534-obs-damages.pdf).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (hereinafter “DMCA”).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c) (detailing the hefty fines
associated with circumvention in violation of the DMCA).
82. It is important to note that in order for the circumvention to be of the type
prohibited by the DMCA, the underlying work must be copyrighted or copyrightable. See
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534–44 (6th Cir. 2004).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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trafficking, or distribution of such a technological measure.
It is
without question that most DRM encryptions would constitute a
85
“technological device,” and therefore, decrypting them would
86
constitute circumvention. It is important to remember that the DMCA
itself only prohibits the access of copyrighted work through the process
87
So
of circumvention of a technological measure to prevent such.
insofar as mere decryption of the encryption algorithms on copyrighted
work is concerned, the DMCA, in conjunction with licensing
agreements forbidding circumvention of DRM, gives real “teeth” to the
punishments available for would-be encryption crackers. If one were to
decrypt the copyrighted content and thereafter distribute it somehow,
then the double-whammy of violation of the DMCA and copyright
infringement would be available remedies.
It is important to reiterate that the first link in the complex DRM
technology and legal chain is encryption. Encryption is the crucial
technology upon which the elaborate DRM system rests. Without
encryption, a tech-savvy consumer would be able to access unprotected
digital content and do whatever he wishes with that content, be it copy
it, distribute it, or any of the other habits legally delegated to copyright
88
holders and their respective licensees.
Encryption, as stated
previously, is a heavily math-based science, implemented solely through
algorithms. It is encryption’s necessity to the DRM system as a whole
that makes it so important. It is its complexity that makes it relevant.
But it is this same complexity that presents issues for DRM patentholders in the post-Bilski patent world. It is with this in mind that one
must next look at the issues of patentability in regards to DRM.
III. THE PATENT-DRM CONUNDRUM
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter that can be
patented as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B). (“[A] technological measure ‘effectively controls
access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.”)
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (“[T]o ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner.”) (emphasis added).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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89

. . .” Supreme Court precedent has determined that such an expansive
term (“any”) indicated that Congress contemplated that patent subject
matter would be broad in scope, and that “ingenuity should receive a
90
liberal encouragement.” Section 100(b) defines a “process” as “a new
use of a process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
91
material.” There are three specific exceptions to the otherwise broad
patentable subject matter: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
92
abstract ideas.” But precedent on the matter has not been consistent
or particularly understandable.
93

A. Knowledge and Not On Numbers

The courts have historically struggled with the limits of patentability
in this context. The difficulty has been determining whether inventions
incorporating algorithms are within patent’s bounds, or alternatively,
fall into the exceptions to patentable subject matter and are thus nonpatentable. The waxing and waning of the courts’ willingness to
broaden or constrict patent’s scope in this regard has been tumultuous,
and opinions have been less than consistent and strayed from
hammering out any bright-line rules. What is an interesting point of
guidance are the various tests implemented by the courts, and the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to formally adopt any of them. A brief
examination of these decisions will show not just what was and became
at stake in the ultimate question of patentability of algorithmic
technology, but will also show the conflicting precedents available to the
Bilski Court, as well as the back-and-forth between the federal courts
and the Supreme Court.
1. Arithmus ex Machina
94

In Gottschalk v. Benson, the United States Supreme Court
examined a patent application involving claims as to a method for
converting binary-coded-decimal numerals into pure binary numerals
95
on any general-purpose computer. The Court, in its determination,
89. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
90. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
91. 35 U.S.C. §100(b) (2006).
92. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
93. THOMAS BENFIELD HARBOTTLE, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (CLASSICAL)
373 (2d ed. 1958) (Plato is quoted as having said “a good decision is based on knowledge and
not on numbers.”).
94. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
95. Id at 64.
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discussed the very issue of patentability of the algorithm involved,
finding that algorithms should be considered with the same scrutiny and
wariness as other “phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts,” explaining that such are
97
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” The Court found
that this abstract idea (the algorithm), tied with no machine in particular
(in this case, any general computer), would pre-empt the mathematical
98
formula and be a patent on the algorithm itself. Interestingly, the
Court in finding this determination briefly touched on language that
would be a motif in the patentability struggle. The Court said that
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or
thing’” is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
99
include particular machines.” This language would echo around the
debate for the next thirty years. The Court had thus given some clarity
as to what was not patentable, in this case an algorithm for converting
numbers from one form to another, and categorized that algorithm as
being within the exceptions to patentability, but gave no concrete
definition for “abstract,” “phenomena of nature,” or any of the like.
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
100
used this guidance in In re Chatfield. While being careful to not be too
101
focused on the term “algorithm,” the court found that a method for
improving the operating efficiency of a computing system containing a
mathematical equation was not, in its entirety, non-patentable, merely
102
because a portion of the claim is a non-patentable algorithm.
The
court also held that the prior argument that a “process patent must
either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to
change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing’” was not
103
determinative.
The Supreme Court contributed some clarity on the subject with its
104
ruling in Parker v. Flook. In Flook, a case involving a claim in which
96. Id. at 64–67.
97. Id. at 67.
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id.
100. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A 1976).
101. Id. at 156 n.5. “Over-concentration on the word ‘algorithm’ alone, for example,
may mislead . . . . It would be unnecessarily detrimental to our patent system to deny
inventors patent protection on the sole ground that their contribution could be broadly
termed an “algorithm.”
102. See id. at 157–58.
103. Id. at 156 n.4 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)).
104. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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105

the only novel part of the claim was an algorithm, the Court reiterated
the unpatentability of mathematical formulae, despite post-solution
106
applications, as an algorithm constitutes a “law of nature.” Citing its
holding in Benson, the Court, yet again, covered the general rule of
107
unpatentability of abstract principles, and again mentioned, without
holding determinative, what would become the machine-or108
transformation test for determining process invention patentability.
The Court also remarked that while the subject matter as a whole must
109
be considered, “if a claim is directed essentially to a method of
calculating, using mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a
110
specific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory.”
2. “As a Whole”
In 1981, the Supreme Court backtracked a bit, in its ruling in
111
Diamond v. Diehr, a case involving a claim for a process for curing
112
The claim
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured products.
involved an algorithm, and while it involved a computer, the Court
113
found that aspect not determinative as to its patentability. Rather, the
114
Court found, oddly enough, that taken “as a whole,” and considering
115
the “novelty of the combination they represent[],” it was worthy of
patent protection, “even though some or all of its elements are not
116
‘novel.’” This was despite the fact that the only novel part of the claim
117
was the steps invoking the algorithm, and the algorithm itself.
Furthermore, the Court argued, dissecting the claims into old and new
elements in such a way as done in Flook would render all inventions

105. See id. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must
be new and useful.”).
106. Id. at 589.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 588 n.9 (“An argument can be made, however, that this Court has only
recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular
apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”).
109. Id. at 594.
110. Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 2030 (1977)).
111. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 181.
114. Id. at 188.
115. Id. at 193 n. 15 (quoting Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).
116. Id. n. 15.
117. See id. at 192–93.
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118

non-patentable.
In a scathing dissent, Justice Stevens points out the
119
obvious discrepancies between this holding and the decisions in Flook
120
and Benson. Justice Stevens pointed out that the only novel part of
121
the claim was the algorithm , and that the process as a whole, as the
majority stated, was not novel, in that the algorithm was applied to a
computer to determine the amount of time that the rubber molding
122
press should remain closed during the rubber-curing process. It is with
this decision that we see the paradigm shift towards a broader patent
scope for algorithm-implemented inventions, possibly from the
123
reasoning in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which gave the legislative
intent to grant patent protection for “anything under the sun that is
124
made by man.” Of course, the issue here is whether a new algorithm
125
applied to a non-novel claim constituted something “made by man.”
3. A Slippery Slope
Yet again, the scope was broadened in the landmark cases In re
126
127
Alappat and State Street Bank,
the latter of which is attributed as
128
being the catalyst for the “patent boom” that still continues. Alappat’s
129
invention involved a “rasterizer” that performed the same overall
function as prior art rasterizers; however, it did so “in a different way”
130
thanks to the implementation of the new algorithm.
The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit cited the struggle the Supreme Court
has had in pinning down and articulating a rule for mathematical subject
118. Id. at 189 n. 12.
119. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 201–02.
121. Id. at 208 (“[T]he only difference between the conventional methods of operating
a molding press and that claimed in the application rests in those steps of the claims which
[sic] relate to the calculation incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or formula
used to control [the heating process].”).
122. See id. at 208–09.
123. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
124. Id. at 309 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Congress., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)).
125. I think it is safe to assume that it is “under the sun.”
126. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
127. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (hereinafter “State Street”).
128. Lori E. Lesser, We’ve Got Algorithm – Software Patents Boom, FINDLAW,
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/1/130894.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
129. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537 (The court itself summarizes what Alappat’s particular
invention did: “in lay terms, the invention is an improvement in an oscilloscope comparable
to a TV having a clearer picture.”); id. at 1538 (The term “rasterizer” is a machine used
specifically in claim 15.).
130. Id. at 1540–1542.
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131

matter, and found that the claim produced a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result” that was “not so ‘abstract and sweeping’ that it would
‘wholly pre-empt’ the use of any apparatus employing the combination
132
of mathematical calculations recited therein.”
Essentially, this
overturned the previous rulings that held software non-patentable,
133
provided that it physically transformed the underlying subject matter.
This ruling cracked open the door to software patents even more, as the
court found that a contrary ruling would render computers operating
pursuant to software “may represent patentable subject matter,
provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the
134
other requirements of Title 35.”
State Street opened the floodgates to software patenting. Reiterating
this “useful, concrete and tangible result,” language in Allapat, the court
135
in State Street found section 101’s bounds to be broad.
The court
supported this contention by finding that the “repetitive use of the
expansive term ‘any’ in §101 shows Congress’s intent not to place any
restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained
136
beyond those specifically recited in §101.”
It was with this mindset
that the court tackled the issue presented before it, which was one for a
data processing system for implementing various aspects of
137
administering investments for a mutual funds administrator.
The
138
court found that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, as applied by the
district court, was improper for determining the patentability of the data
139
processing system.
The court argued that the test was misleading,
because a patent claim “employing a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though
[the exceptions listed] would not, by [themselves] be entitled to such

131. Id. at 1543.
132. Id. at 1544 (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68–72 (1972)).
133. Id. at 1543.
134. Id. at l545.
135. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998).
136. Id. The court also cited the Supreme Court’s own words in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), that Congress intended §101 to cover “anything under
the sun that is made by man.” Id.
137. See id. at 1370.
138. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008); State Street, 149 F.3d at
1374–75 (This test is only mentioned in passing, for the sake of brevity. To delve further into
it would go outside of the necessities of this Comment. Plus, the court in In re Bilski and State
Street did away with this test, thus making it a non-issue in any further determination on
encryption patentability.).
139. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373–74.
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140

protection.”
This circular argument applies also to algorithms, the
141
court explains. This, the court reasons, follows from the new rule after
Diehr and Alappat, and under that rule, the claim is still patentable
subject matter if the claim produces “a useful, concrete and tangible
142
result.”
Thus, the court concludes, the transformation of data, for
example, through an algorithm, produces a “useful, concrete and
143
tangible result,” regardless of the physical requirements stated in
144
Alappat.
The result of this decision was a “land rush mentality” of patent
applications, which swarmed the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
145
and Federal Circuit. What followed was an “endless rush” of patents,
146
from the mundane to the complex.
This overload has since
overburdened the PTO, a warning prophesized long ago by Justice
Stevens in his dissent in Diehr as reasoning for limiting the scope of
147
patentability for process claims incorporating abstract ideas.
Regardless, the culmination of these decisions presented a broad area of
patentability for an already overburdened patent office, finding
difficulty in keeping up with the demands of the growing digital
148
revolution.
Thus the courts have had difficulty defining precisely where to draw
the line on patent claims involving algorithms. Though, this is not to say
that some clarity cannot be gleaned from the reaping in this area. There
exists the machine-or-transformation test, slowly defined throughout
this era to mean that a process claim that involves an abstract idea, such
as an algorithm, is patentable if it either is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or transforms material from one state to another.
Alternatively, one could look at the holdings in Alappat and State Street
and look at the patent claims as a whole, and see if it produces
149
something that would be considered “useful, concrete, and tangible.”
140. Id. at 1374.
141. Id.
142. See id. (citing In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
143. Id. at 1373.
144. See Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526
145. Jay Dratler, Jr., Article: Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38
AKRON L. REV. 299, 303 (2005).
146. See id.
147. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Martha Groves, A Patent Dispute; Lawsuit Raises a Hot Issue in Exploding
Technology, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at D1.
149. Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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4. A Solution?
It was with this multicolored backdrop that Bernard Bilski entered
the patent arena. In the 1990s, Bilski developed a method for using
hedge contracts to reduce the risk that a commodity’s wholesale price
150
might change, and applied for a patent. Bilski’s patent application was
rejected in September 2006, as the claimed method was ruled to be
merely an abstract idea by the Patent Examiner at the USPTO, and
151
Bilski appealed to the Federal Circuit in early 2007.
The Federal Circuit handed down its ruling on October 30, 2008, in
152
In re Bilski. In this decision, the Federal Circuit, seeing the numerous
tests and commentary on the issue, decided to adopt the machine-ortransformation test as the sole means for testing the patentability of a
153
process claim.
The court reconciled the conflicting commentary by
finding that this test could explain the finding in the Supreme Court’s
154
holdings.
The court then systematically examined and rejected the
remaining tests for patentability, ultimately concluding that the
machine-or-transformation test was the best, and only test to be
155
applied.
What this long romp through the case law history has shown is the
difficulty and frustration experienced by the courts in finding an
appropriate means for determining the patentability of claims involving
abstract subject matter. The machine-or-transformation test was a
conclusion reached out of necessity by the Federal Circuit. The need
for some kind of ultimate test seemed necessary to not only curb the
growing number of patent applications and relieve some of the burden
156
on the USPTO and Federal Circuit that resulted from State Street, but
also to prevent the stymieing of progress by overbroad patent claims
157
and patent trolls.
Arguably, this rationale proved successful. From
150. Steven Seidenberg, Bilski’s Battle, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 20, 2007),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2007/10/01/bilskis-battle.
151. Id.
152. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
153. Id. at 956.
154. See id. at 956 (applying the test to decisions in Benson and Flook); see id. at 957
(applying the test to Diehr).
155. Id. at 956–64.
156. See generally Kevin Coughlin, “Technology Upends the Meaning of Invention
Patent Requests Shift to Ideas, Know-How,” THE STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Mar. 12,
2000, at 1.
157. And was successful. See Austin Modine, “US Court Blocks Amazon-style Patent
Trolls,”
The
Register,
(Oct.
31,
2008),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2008/10/31/us_court_of_appeals_federal_circuit_business_method_patent_decision/.
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October 30, 2008 (the date of the Bilski holding) until March 8, 2010,
out of the 140 cases to the Board dealing with, inter alia, a section 101
rejection, the Board held that a claim was non-statutory subject matter
158
78.3% of the time. Maybe the USPTO and interested onlookers had
finally gotten some respite.
B. What the Circuit Giveth, the Supreme Court Taketh Away
1. Division of the Issues
The sigh of relief would not echo long, however. When the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in July 2009, the arena was set. . . the fighters in
their corners, and the peasants had gathered round to cheer for their
respective champion. Whether Bernard Bilski was a hero or a villain
depended on which side of the aisle one sat. Some saw him as
continuing the status quo of the broad patent regime, while others
simply saw him as an inventor trying to protect his creation. Regardless,
the case was the culmination of decades of debate and frustration, and
the Intellectual Property world was watching.
159
What they got instead, on June 28th, 2010, in Bilski v. Kappos, was
something of a letdown. Despite In re Bilski’s comprising a colossal 72
pages (including multiple dissents), the Supreme Court decided the
160
complex issue in as few as 41 pages.
The Court held that while the
machine-or-transformation test is “useful” and “important” and “an
investigative tool” for determining process claims’ patentability, it “is
161
not the sole test.”
Further, the Supreme Court ruled that business
162
163
method patents were abstract, and thus not patentable. While this
answered an important question in the debate, namely the patentability
of algorithmic business method patents, it failed to give any clarity on
arguably the biggest issue in the debate—the patentability of other
algorithm-dependant processes, such as software and encryption
schemes. The Supreme Court thus ruined yet another attempt by the
lower courts to not only ease the patent workload for themselves and
the USPTO, but also ruined another attempt by the Federal Circuit to
prevent patent abuse and alleviate the alleged burden on innovation by
158. Peter Ludwig, Machine-or-Transformation Test Hits the Board: Patent-Eligible
Subject Matter Following Bilski, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 139, 141 (2010).
159. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
160. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
161. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 3231.
163. Id.
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overbroad patent drafting.
2. Remainder Questions
One takeaway is that DRM might be in better standing had the
Federal Circuit’s ruling won out.
Clearly, the machine-ortransformation test presents a tougher standard, and one that an
algorithm-specific technology might not have been able to overcome.
Some DRM encryption schemes and distribution processes are not
164
restricted to one machine or apparatus, and does the encryption and
subsequent decryption of digital content really “transform material from
one form to another?” It is a tough question to answer. In Grams, the
court found that the algorithm involved “[did] not change any aspect of
165
the physical process” of the material present. This begs the question
as to whether encryption itself changes the physical aspect of the data,
merely by scrambling it and rendering it unreadable.
The issue regarding DRM encryption is not necessarily the rejection
of the machine-or-transformation test, itself; rather, it is the damaging
commentary in Bilski v. Kappos that endangers DRM encryption’s
166
survival. “Rather than adopting categorical rules that might have
wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case
narrowly on the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and
167
Diehr. . . .” The Court reiterated the three exceptions to section 101’s
patentability principles, those being “laws of nature, physical
168
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
There is an unavoidable similarity
between Benson and DRM encryption, and the Court’s reverence to the
former calls the patentability of the latter into question. In Benson, the
Court observed a patent on a process for converting numerals to pure
binary numerals would have, in effect, been a patent on the
169
algorithm/formula itself.
It stands to reason then, that given
encryption’s very function—the transformation of digital content to
unreadable content, and back to digital content— the Court’s deference
to Benson might call into question encryption’s patentability. The
Board often states that a claim fails to transform a particular article

164. Take for example, encryption on eBook files, which are readable on a computer,
an eBook reader, a cell phone, or a tablet device.
165. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
166. Oh God forbid such a thing!
167. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
168. Id. at 3225.
169. Id. at 3230.
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because the data does not represent “physical” and “tangible” objects.
This also directly clashes with the chance of the machine-ortransformation test saving encryption from falling outside of section
101’s bounds. The Court also cites Flook, describing the claim therein
as containing nothing novel or innovative, save “reliance on a
171
Taking this into consideration, it seems
mathematical algorithm.”
likely that DRM encryption schemes, which are novel only insofar as
172
they contain new, “stronger” algorithms, would likely be nonpatentable subject matter, too. The Court finally accredited Diehr with
173
its determination that business method claims are non-patentable.
There is no guarantee that the reasoning in Diehr will prove successful
with DRM encryption schemes either, as it is a point of debate as to
whether the claim in Diehr was ruled patentable simply because it
involved an industrial process, or because it transformed matter from
one form to another, as the decision is not entirely clear. Even
considering DRM encryption “as a whole,” per the lesson learned in
Diehr and stated in Bilski, it is unlikely that, given the surrounding prior
art and major role that the algorithms play in encryption, it will pass
patent muster. Thus, DRM exists in a kind of grey area, not clearly
qualifying for any of the numerous tests passed down through the
precedent. Of course, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clarify
anything on the matter only further complicates the debate.
The difficulty really lies in meting out just “how much” of a role the
algorithm may play in a patentable claim, given the numerous tests
available. Indeed, the USPTO itself needed help in determining how to
174
approach this issue in Bilski’s wake. In the case of DRM encryption
schemes, none of these tests really seem to pass. Is it a “useful, concrete
175
and tangible result” to encrypt and/or decrypt digital content? Does
encryption’s act of encrypting data “transform” it from one state to
176
177
another? Must encryption be tied to a particular machine? Finally,
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Ludwig, supra note 158, at 154.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978)).
See supra Section A(2).
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230.
Ryan Paul, As USPTO evaluates Bilski, Red Hat says end software patents, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/as-uspto-evaluates-bilski-rulingred-hat-says-end-software-patents.ars?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=
rss (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
175. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
176. Per the second prong of the “machine-or-transformation” test.
177. Per the first prong of the “machine-or-transformation” test.
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where do the encryption algorithms fit into the equation, and, if they are
the only novel part of an encryption device, does that render the
remainder of the application unpatentable? Will DRM encryption
survive in a post-Bilski world?
IV. SOLVING THE EQUATION
The first step to solving this problem lies in the term “algorithm.” In
Benson, “algorithm” was defined as “a procedure for solving a given
178
179
type of mathematical problem,” a definition echoed in Flook and
180
Diehr.
This definition creates a paradox. Algorithms, by their very
181
are useful and have application
nature as problem solvers,
182
183
somewhere, thus meeting the criteria in State Street. In spite of that,
the Court has said time and time again that algorithms are abstract
184
ideas, and thus outside of patent bounds.
One solution is that the Supreme Court should either re-define
“algorithm,” to expressly state what types of algorithms are not
patentable, or it should just do away with the algorithm exception
altogether. The former would present a circular problem of defining
what types of “former” algorithms are abstract, thus warranting the
“new” “algorithm” label within statutory limits. This could be more of a
problem than it is worth, having expert witnesses and lengthy briefs
explaining why one algorithm is “newer” than another algorithm, ad
infinitum. Doing away with the notion that algorithms themselves are
considered “abstract” would be doable if algorithms themselves were
not patentable within larger claims, regardless of the surrounding prior
art. Ultimately, there must be some ruling as to whether algorithms’
role has changed in society, and whether they are now unique creations,
185
worthy of patentability, or whether they still remain “abstract” natural
178. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
179. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
180. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981).
181. Per the definitions provided by Benson, Flook, and Diehr, supra notes 178–80.
182. Allen Clark Zoracki, When is an Algorithm Invented? The Need for a New
Paradigm for Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property Protection, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 579, 590 (2005) (hereafter “Zoracki Article”).
183. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
184. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
185. This may be a question more appropriately answered by a more engineeringoriented mind, as engineers with whom I have spoken have unanimously echoed the
sentiment that a complicated algorithm applied to a useful function is itself creative and
useful enough to warrant a patent.
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phenomena.
186
Another option would be to cave into the open source demands
and do away with software patenting, and thus encryption patenting,
altogether. Proponents for such argue that information is “the oxygen
187
of the modern age,” and thus needs to be free.
They argue that
software and other information products do not provide any new
information to the public, and thus a patent bargain, traditionally a
“bargain” between the patentee and the public, presents a one-sided
188
bargain. Further, copyright protection exists for some software code
189
as well, so it could be argued that encryption algorithms fall within the
realm of copyrights. This is the best method of achieving the ultimate
goals of intellectual property law, believes prominent IP scholar Mark
190
Lemley, giving it as little protection as possible.
Others argue that
191
DRM may render traditional copyright laws completely irrelevant.
V. CONCLUSION
Aside from an act of Congress further limiting or expanding the
current scope of section 101, there are limited options for the courts in
determining whether encryption schemes are patentable or not, and if
not, what remedy exists to allow them to be, if necessary. If they are
patentable, then the problem is what role algorithms play, and where to
draw the line in regards to determining what constitutes a “novel”
algorithm or an old, unpatentable algorithm. If they are not patentable,
then the DRM industry is done for, or had better lobby for some
contrary legislation. While there is no easy fix, as evidenced by, if
nothing else, thirty years of arguing over the subject, it is clear that
something must be done. Patent law is simply falling behind the
technology it was intended to protect, which could prove very hazardous
with the digital age screaming onward at breakneck speed. In regards to
DRM encryption, a failure to do so could prove fatal to the DRM
186. See Paul, supra note 174.
187. Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to be Free, but Information Products do
not: Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2099, 2100 (2009).
188. Id. at 2106–07.
189. Id. at 2107.
190. Gary Miller, On Federal Preemption of Contractual First Sale Waivers, BOSTON
COLLEGE INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 1 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://bciptf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/2-ON-FEDERAL-PREEMPTION-OF-CONTRACTUAL-FIRSTSALE-WAIVERS.pdf.
191. Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1223
(2000).
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industry, for without patents to provide legal protections for licensing
the encryption keys and devices, what incentive is there to produce
them at all? This could have disastrous effects on not only the DRM
industry, but also the various media and content outlets that rely upon
that industry, which would be unable to protect digital content from
unauthorized access and distribution. This danger is not limited to
digital content providers, but also those who use encryption to buy and
sell online, create digital signatures, and send confidential or sensitive
information on secure networks. While mathematics might be “Godgiven,” or naturally occurring phenomena, algorithms must lie
somewhere between the human and the divine, and the courts must
draw this line closer towards the former, or else risk bringing down the
whole system. As the world continues to shrink, the need to protect
information will continue to expand, and the role of DRM will become
more and more important. Let us hope that for once law can match
pace with technology.
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